Fiscal Year 2003 FHWA-536 Report for the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) requires state transportation agencies to submit a biennial report on local highway finances. The purpose of these reports is to provide FHWA with the data it needs to capture the financing of highway activities at the local level. Based on this information, it can identify trends in revenue, expenditures, investments, and program development, and in turn make decisions about future investments. The report, FHWA-536, asks agencies to report on four areas of local highway finance: 1) disposition of highway-user revenues; 2) revenues used for roads and streets identified by source and funding type; 3) road and street expenditures identified by purpose of activity; and 4) local highway debt status. This document summarizes data submitted to fulfill the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet’s FHWA-536 obligations in FY 2003. Total receipts were $291,585,855, an increase of$21,845,066 compared to FY 2001. Total disbursements equaled $296,356,837, an increase of$18,025,753 over FY 2001

Fiscal Year 2007 FHWA-536 Report for the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) requires state transportation agencies to submit a biennial report on local highway finances. The purpose of these reports is to provide FHWA with the data it needs to capture the financing of highway activities at the local level. Based on this information, it can identify trends in revenue, expenditures, investments, and program development, and in turn make decisions about future investments. The report, FHWA-536, asks agencies to report on four areas of local highway finance: 1) disposition of highway-user revenues; 2) revenues used for roads and streets identified by source and funding type; 3) road and street expenditures identified by purpose of activity; and 4) local highway debt status. This document summarizes data submitted to fulfill the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet’s FHWA-536 obligations in FY 2007. Total receipts were $398,572,084, an increase of$53,255,360 compared to FY 2005. Total disbursements equaled $353,144,163 346,188,072, an increase of$6,956,091 over FY 2005

Fiscal Year 2001 FHWA-536 Report for the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) requires state transportation agencies to submit a biennial report on local highway finances. The purpose of these reports is to provide FHWA with the data it needs to capture the financing of highway activities at the local level. Based on this information, it can identify trends in revenue, expenditures, investments, and program development, and in turn make decisions about future investments. The report, FHWA-536, asks agencies to report on four areas of local highway finance: 1) disposition of highway-user revenues; 2) revenues used for roads and streets identified by source and funding type; 3) road and street expenditures identified by purpose of activity; and 4) local highway debt status. This document summarizes data submitted to fulfill the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet’s FHWA-536 obligations in FY 2001. Total receipts were $269,740,789, a decline of$11,073,328 compared to FY 1999. Total disbursements equaled $278,331,084, an increase of$35,758,628 over FY 1999

Fiscal Year 2005 FHWA-536 Report for the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) requires state transportation agencies to submit a biennial report on local highway finances. The purpose of these reports is to provide FHWA with the data it needs to capture the financing of highway activities at the local level. Based on this information, it can identify trends in revenue, expenditures, investments, and program development, and in turn make decisions about future investments. The report, FHWA-536, asks agencies to report on four areas of local highway finance: 1) disposition of highway-user revenues; 2) revenues used for roads and streets identified by source and funding type; 3) road and street expenditures identified by purpose of activity; and 4) local highway debt status. This document summarizes data submitted to fulfill the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet’s FHWA-536 obligations in FY 2005. Total receipts were $345,316,724, an increase of$53,730,869 compared to FY 2003. Total disbursements equaled $346,188,072, an increase of$49,831,235 over FY 2003

Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Material Dynamic Risk Management

Each year, over 2 billion tons of hazardous materials are shipped in the United States, with over half of that being moved on commercial vehicles. Given their relatively poor or nonexistent defenses and inconspicuousness, commercial vehicles transporting hazardous materials are an easy target for terrorists. Before carriers or security agencies recognize that something is amiss, their contents could be detonated or released. From 2006 to 2015, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) recorded 144,643 incidents involving a release of hazardous materials. Although there were no known instances of terrorism being the cause, accidental releases involving trucks carrying hazardous materials are not an uncommon occurrence. At this time, no systems have been developed and operationalized to monitor the movement of vehicles transporting hazardous materials. The purpose of this dissertation is to propose a comprehensive risk management system for monitoring Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Materials (HSSMs) which are shipped aboard commercial vehicles in the U.S. Chapter 2 examines the history and current state of hazardous materials transportation. Since the late 19th century, the federal government often introduced new regulations in response to hazardous materials incidents. However, over the past 15 years few binding policies or legislation have been enacted. This demonstrates that government agencies and the U.S. Congress are not inclined to introduce new laws and rules that could hamper business. In 2003, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and other agencies led efforts to develop a prototype hazardous materials tracking system (PHTS) that mapped the location of hazardous materials shipments and quantified the level of risk associated with each one. The second half of this chapter uses an in-­‐depth gap analysis to identify deficiencies and demonstrate in what areas the prototype system does not comply with government specifications. Chapter 3 addresses the lack of customized risk equations for Tier 1 HSSMs and develops a new set of risk equations that can be used to dynamically evaluate the level of risk associated with individual hazardous materials shipments. This chapter also discusses the results of a survey that was administered to public and private industry stakeholders. Its purpose was to understand the current state of hazardous materials regulations, the likelihood of hazardous materials release scenarios, what precautionary measures can be used, and what influence social variables may have on the aggregate consequences of a hazardous materials release. The risk equation developed in this paper takes into account the survey responses as well as those risk structures already in place. The overriding goal is to preserve analytical tractability, implement a form that is usable by federal agencies, and provide stakeholders with accurate information about the risk profiles of different vehicles. Due to congressional inaction on hazardous 3 materials transportation issues, securing support from carriers and other industry stakeholders is the most viable solution to bolstering hazardous materials security. Chapter 4 presents the system architecture for The Dynamic Hazardous Materials Risk Assessment Framework (DHMRA), a GIS-­‐based environment in which hazardous materials shipments can be monitored in real time. A case study is used to demonstrate the proposed risk equation; it simulates a hazardous materials shipment traveling from Ashland, Kentucky to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The DHMRA maps risk data, affording security personnel and other stakeholders the opportunity to evaluate how and why risk profiles vary across time and space. DHRMA’s geo-­‐fencing capabilities also trigger automatic warnings. This framework, once fully implemented, can inform more targeted policies to enhance the security of hazardous materials. It will contribute to maintaining secure and efficient supply chains while protecting the communities that live nearest to the most heavily trafficked routes. Continuously monitoring hazardous materials provides a viable way to understand the risks presented by a shipment at a given moment and enables better, more coordinated responses in the event of a release. Implementation of DHRMA will be challenging because it requires material and procedural changes that could disrupt agency operations or business practices — at least temporarily. Nevertheless, DHRMA stands ready for implementation, and to make the shipment of hazardous materials a more secure, safe, and certain process. Although DHMRA was designed primarily with terrorism in mind, it is also useful for examining the impacts of accidental hazardous materials releases. Future iterations of DHMRA could expand on its capabilities by incorporating modeling data on the release and dispersion of toxic gases, liquids, and other substances

The North American Transportation Security Center – SERRI Analysis Update

Executive Summary There are over 800,000 hazardous materials (hazmat) shipments over the nation’s roads each day. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), terrorist activity related to the transportation of hazardous materials represents a significant threat to public safety and the nation’s critical infrastructure. Specifically, the federal government has identified the government’s inability to track hazmat shipments on a real-time basis as a significant security vulnerability. In 2004, the U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) completed a study to determine if “smart truck” technology such as GPS tracking, wireless modems, panic buttons, and on-board computers could be used to enhance hazmat shipment security. The FMCSA study concluded that “smart truck” technology will be highly effective in protecting hazmat shipments from terrorists. The FMCSA study also concluded that “smart truck” technology deployment will produce a huge security benefit and an overwhelmingly positive return on investment for hazmat carriers. The FMCSA study led to the U.S. Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP). This congressionally mandated pilot program was undertaken to demonstrate if a hazmat truck tracking center was feasible from a technology and systems perspective. The HTSP project team built a technology prototype of a hazmat truck tracking system to show that “smart truck” technology could be crafted into an effective and efficient system for tracking hazmat shipments. The HTSP project team also built the Universal Communications Interface – the XML gateway for hazmat carriers to use to provide data to a centralized truck tracking center. In August 2007, Congress enacted the 9/11 Act (PL110-53) that directs TSA to develop a program - consistent with the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot - to facilitate the tracking of motor carrier shipments of security-sensitive materials. In June 2008, TSA took a major step forward in establishing a national hazmat security program by issuing guidance for shipments of Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Materials (HSSMs), the riskiest shipments from a security perspective. TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM guidance includes Security Action Items which specify security measures – including vehicle tracking – that TSA believes are prudent security measures for shippers and carriers to follow. Compliance with TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM guidance is voluntary but TSA is expected to issue regulations based on the Tier 1 HSSM Security Action Items that will make compliance mandatory. Establishment of a Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking center is critical to implementation of a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on the Security Action items by TSA. The HTSP technology prototype was an excellent first step toward an operational Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system, however, it falls far short of what TSA needs in an operational system. The Kentucky Transportation Center at the University of Kentucky completed a study December 2008 that examined market drivers that would influence the design and operation of a Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system. The study was funded by the South East Region Research Initiative (SERRI). The objective of this deliverable is to update the SERRI report with a specific focus on two item: new or enhanced fleet tracking vendor product and service offerings; and programmatic conditions that have changed since December 200

The North American Transportation Security Center – Fedtrak Specifications and Release Plan

Executive Summary In April 2008, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) completed work on the TSA Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP). This congressionally mandated pilot program was undertaken to prove that a hazmat truck tracking center was feasible from a technology and systems perspective. The HTSP project team built a technology prototype of a hazmat truck tracking system to show that “smart truck” technology could be crafted into an effective and efficient system for tracking hazmat shipments. The HTSP project team also built the Universal Communications Interface – the XML gateway for hazmat carriers to use to provide data to a centralized truck tracking center. In August 2007, Congress enacted the 9/11 Act (PL110-53) that directs TSA to develop a program - consistent with the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot - to facilitate the tracking of motor carrier shipments of security-sensitive materials. In June 2008, TSA took a major step forward in establishing a national hazmat security program by issuing guidance for shipments of Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Materials (HSSMs), the riskiest shipments from a security perspective. TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM guidance includes Security Action Items which specify security measures – including vehicle tracking – that TSA believes are prudent security measures for shippers and carriers to follow. Compliance with TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM guidance is voluntary but TSA is expected to issue regulations based on the Tier 1 HSSM Security Action Items that will make compliance mandatory. Establishment of a Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking center is critical to implementation of a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on the Security Action items by TSA. The HTSP technology prototype was an excellent first step toward an operational Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system. However, it falls far short of what TSA needs in an operational system. In an earlier deliverable, the Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) at the University of Kentucky examined the “gaps” between the HTSP technology prototype and an operational Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system. TSA needs a Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system to support its regulatory ambitions, and FedTrak is being built to specifically serve as the implementing tool for TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program. Deliverables 1.1 and 1.2 laid the foundation for development of the Specifications and Release plan for FedTrak, a Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system. The Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) held joint application design (JAD) sessions in Northern Virginia (June 3-5), in Lexington, KY (June 23-26) and again in Northern Virginia (July 15-16) to support development of the plan. A representative from NIHS attended the meeting in Lexington. This deliverable summarizes those meetings and the development approach the KTC project team will follow in building the FedTrak system. Specifically, this deliverable: summarizes specifications arising from project team JAD sessions (Section 1.2 and Appendix A); describes how “gaps” identified in Deliverable 1.2 will be filled (Section 1.1); and describes the FedTrak project team’s architectural design and development approach (Sections 2, 3 and 4 ). Release plans for the FedTrak shipper/carrier portals, the FedTrak electronic manifest application, and the FedTrak electronic route application are presented under separate cover

The North American Transportation Security Center – Technology Prototype Gap Analysis

Executive Summary There are over 800,000 hazardous materials (hazmat) shipments over the nation’s roads each day. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), terrorist activity related to the transportation of hazardous materials represents a significant threat to public safety and the nation’s critical infrastructure. Specifically, the federal government has identified the government’s inability to track hazmat shipments on a real-time basis as a significant security vulnerability. In 2004, the U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) completed a study to determine if “smart truck” technology such as GPS tracking, wireless modems, panic buttons, and onboard computers could be used to enhance hazmat shipment security. The FMCSA study concluded that “smart truck” technology will be highly effective in protecting hazmat shipments from terrorists. The FMCSA study also concluded that “smart truck” technology deployment will produce a huge security benefit and an overwhelmingly positive return on investment for hazmat carriers. The FMCSA study led to the U.S. Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP). This congressionally mandated pilot program was undertaken to demonstrate if a hazmat truck tracking center was feasible from a technology and systems perspective. The HTSP project team built a technology prototype of a hazmat truck tracking system to show that “smart truck” technology could be crafted into an effective and efficient system for tracking hazmat shipments. The HTSP project team also built the Universal Communications Interface – the XML gateway for hazmat carriers to use to provide data to a centralized truck tracking center. In August 2007, Congress enacted the 9/11 Act (PL110-53) that directs TSA to develop a program - consistent with the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot - to facilitate the tracking of motor carrier shipments of security-sensitive materials. In June 2008, TSA took a major step forward in establishing a national hazmat security program by issuing guidance for shipments of Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Materials (HSSMs), the riskiest shipments from a security perspective. TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM guidance includes Security Action Items which specify security measures – including vehicle tracking – that TSA believes are prudent security measures for shippers and carriers to follow. Compliance with TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM guidance is voluntary but TSA is expected to issue regulations based on the Tier 1 HSSM Security Action Items that will make compliance mandatory. Establishment of a Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking center is critical to implementation of a Tier 1 HSSM regulatory program based on the Security Action items by TSA. The HTSP technology prototype was an excellent first step toward an operational Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system, however, it falls far short of what TSA needs in an operational system. This deliverable examines the “gaps” between the HTSP technology prototype and an operational Tier 1 HSSM truck tracking system. It draws upon the work of an Independent Verification and Validation contractor that evaluated the HTSP technology prototype. It also examines TSA needs related to implementation of a regulatory program based on Tier 1 HSSM Security Action Items

Social Justice Mitigation in Transportation Projects: Why and How Lexington Fayette Urban County Government Can Support the Lexington Community Land Trust’s Path to Self-Sustainability

The city of Lexington has reached a critical shortage of affordable housing available to families earning 80% - 50% of area median income (AMI). This study focuses on how to grow the Lexington CLT into self-sustainability while also narrowing the affordable housing gaps in Fayette County. Current research offers support for the city’s affordable housing program to adopt the community land trust model (CLT). The research recommends using tools such as the Lexington CLT, the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Landbank Authority (LFUCLA), and Lexington’s Affordable Housing Trust Fund, along with new development incentives, to develop a housing strategy that is cost effective and grows rather than shrinks its portfolio of units. The CLT model performs better than other traditional affordable housing models in a variety of achievement measures, including keeping units affordable for future buyers after the initial buyer received a subsidy to purchase the home. CLTs move modest income families into successful homeownership, and unlike traditional models of delivering affordable housing, the ability to retain affordability for subsequent sales requires no additional public or private subsidy. CLTs are known for their commitment to stewardship, which extends to looking out for the homeowner and family after the home is purchased. Most importantly, CLTs keep neighborhoods stable and family wealth safe by preventing foreclosure. When a city delivers housing through a CLT, they collect critical data that aids governments and the public in determining the effectiveness of affordable housing programs across locally and the nation